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In simultaneous ascending price auctions with heterogeneous goods Brusco and Lopomo
[2002] derive collusive equilibria, where bidders divide objects among themselves, while
keeping the prices low. Considering a simultaneous ascending price auction with a ﬁxed
deadline, i.e. the hard close auction format, a prisoner’s dilemma situation results and
collusive equilibria do not longer exist, even for only two bidders. Hence, we introduce
a further reason for sniping behavior in Hard Close auctions, i.e. to appear to collude
early in the auction and to defect at the very last moment.
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1. Introduction
Brusco and Lopomo [2002] (BL) consider collusive behavior in simultaneous ascend-
ing price auctions, i.e. in English auctions which are conducted in parallel (see also
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn [2005]). Assuming private values, they derive a
symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the bidders split the markets by
signaling their favorite market, even if communication is not allowed.a Therefore, a
“collusive agreement” holds due to the punishment mechanism, because defection
leads to a “bidding war”.b The hard close auction format, i.e. an English auc-
tion which is limited in time as on eBay.com, disables the punishment mechanism.
We show that in hard close auctions collusive behavior is dominated by a sniping
aContrary to BL, we focus on no complementarities cases.
bKwasnica and Sherstyuk [2007] test this theoretical consideration experimentally and conclude
that “outcomes of these auctions, when classiﬁed as collusive, often match the above-mentioned
signaling model quite well”.
75
In
t. 
G
am
e 
Th
eo
ry
 R
ev
. 2
01
1.
13
:7
5-
82
. D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.c
om
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
LU
X
EM
BO
U
RG
 o
n 
03
/1
4/
14
. F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
November 18, 2011 11:14 WSPC/0219-1989 151-IGTR 00285
76 S. Fu¨llbrunn
strategy, i.e. appearing to collude early in the auction and defecting at the very last
moment.c
In the following section, we introduce bidding behavior in the auction formats
being considered for a single object in an online auction framework. Section 3
sketches the ﬁndings of BL and provides an analoguous approach in the hard close
auction format. Finally, we conclude.
2. Separated Auctions
We compare bidding behavior using the framework of a soft close auction, the
“online” version of the English auction, and the hard close auction. In both cases,
we implement a bidding agent in the model according to the eBay pricing rule used
in Ockenfels and Roth [2006]. Bidders submit a “maximum amount” that they are
willing to pay for the object. The bidding agent overbids all other bids “up to
the maximum bid”, i.e. the agent “increases the bid by increments only as much
as necessary to maintain a high bid position”.d Keeping the increment as small
as possible (zero), we model the auctions as dynamic second-price formats with
discrete bidding stages (Fu¨llbrunn and Sadrieh [forthcoming]).
Hence, at any time t, the current price equals the second highest bid submitted
during the previous stage. The current holder at time t is the bidder who has
submitted the highest bid. At each stage, bidders are informed on the current
price and on their status as current holders. After the auction, the current holder
receives the objects and pays second highest bid. In case of a tie, the holder is
determined randomly with equal probability amongst the high bidders and the price
equals the highest bid. We consider a private value environment and the payoﬀ of
a buyer equals the diﬀerence between her valuation and the price. Other bidders
receive no payoﬀ. Since the auction is symmetric, private values are identically and
independently drawn from a common distribution which is common knowledge.
Bidders cannot observe the other bidders’ values, face no liquidity constraints and
are risk neutral.
The hard close auction consists of T stages. The soft close auction consists of
at least T stages. If no bid is submitted in T , the auction ends. As long as bids are
submitted in stages T, T +1, . . . a further stage occurs. In this case the auction ends
after a stage without a bid. This framework has the same features as the English
auction, i.e. the bidding agents play the equilibrium strategy of the English auction.
Due to the bidding agent framework, the terminal stage in both formats equals
a sealed bid second-price auction, where the weakly dominant strategy is to submit
a bid that equals the valuation (Vickrey [1961]). Bids below valuations in previous
cSniping is a widely accepted stylized fact and has several reasons: sniping prevents incremen-
tal (Wintr [2008]) and shill bidding (Engelberg and Williams [2009]), it prevents the revealing of
information during early stages (Rothkopf et al. [1990]) or is due to uncertainty over one’s own
private valuation (Rasmusen [2006]). See Ockenfels et al. [2006] for an overview.
dSee http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/bidding-overview.html#incremental how it works on eBay.
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stages are arbitrary. Bids above valuations bear a risk of paying more for the object
than the object is worth. Hence, in equilibrium the bidder with the highest valuation
receives the object and pays a price that equals the second highest valuation.e
“Sniping”, i.e. bids according to the weakly dominant strategy for the ﬁrst time
in T , remains a reasonable strategy only in the hard close auction. However, with
private values the revenue equivalence theorem holds and the ex ante revenues are
the same in both auction formats (Myerson [1981]).
3. Simultaneous Auctions
In our model, two risk neutral bidders (i = x, y) compete for two heterogeneous
goods (j = 1, 2). The bidders’ valuation for each good, vij is identically and inde-
pendently drawn from the same probability distribution with limits 0 and 1, density
f(v) and c.d.f. F (v). As in BL (p. 414), we assume E(v) :=
∫ 1
0
≤ 12 . Without this
assumption, both objects can be obtained at a low expected price, even without
colluding. The payoﬀ function for bidder x depending on ﬁnal bids βx1, βx2 and
βy1, βy2 is (respectively for bidder y)
πx =


vx1 − p1 + vx2 − p2, if βx1 > βy1 and βx2 > βy2;
vx1 − p1, if βx1 > βy1 and βx2 < βy2;
vx2 − p2, if βx1 < βy1 and βx2 > βy2;
0, if βx1 < βy1 and βx2 < βy2,
where pj is the price in the respective market. The bidders can submit bids in two
simultaneous but separated dynamic second-price auctions. In order to keep things
simple we assume T = 2. In hard close auctions, both markets simultaneously start
with stage 1 and end with stage 2. Thus, the bidders can submit only two bids in
each market. In soft close auctions, both markets simultaneously start with stage
1 and simultaneously end either after stage 2, if no bid is submitted in stage 2 in
either market, or after stage 2+s, if bidders submit bids in any stage 2, 3, . . .2+s−1
but neither bids in stage 2 + s.
The lowest bid is b0 = 0 and the bidders have the possibility not to bid, i.e. they
bid ω. A bid in stage t by bidder i in market j is btij .
3.1. The simultaneous soft close auction
In BL, proposition 0 claims that overbidding any price as long as positive payoﬀs
are possible (SEA strategy) forms a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.f However, with
some consistent beliefs, proposition 1 has established the existence of a symmetric
perfect Bayesian equilibrium which dominates the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in
eAs is generally known, asymmetric equilibria in second price auctions exist. For example, only
the bidder with the highest value submits a bid. However, we refer to equilibria with symmetric
strategies.
fWe assume the bidders do not overbid their private valuation.
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SEA strategies in terms of bidders’ surplus.g According to proposition 0, our bidding
agent framework leads to a modiﬁcation of the SEA strategy: we refer to the “SSC”
strategy as ﬁnally submitting their own valuation in any market as maximum bids.
The bidding agent then bids the next highest maximum bid in the respected market.
However, the equilibrium results hold as in proposition 0 in BL.
Any simple collusion (CSC) strategy that is analoguous to Proposition 1 of BL
is (0 ≤ bij ≤ vij):
• If vi1 > vi2 submit b1i1 = bi1 and b1i2 = ω;
• If vi1 < vi2 submit b1i1 = ω and b1i2 = bi2;
• If, in stage 2,
b1x1 = ω and b
1
y1 ≥ 0 and b1x2 ≥ 0 and b1y2 = ω
or
b1x1 ≥ 0 and b1y1 = ω and b1x2 = ω and b1y2 ≥ 0
the bidders divide the markets among each other and take no further action in
the following stages ;
• if, in stage 2, b1xj ≥ 0 and b1yj ≥ 0 or someone defects from the bidding instruc-
tions given above, then all types revert to the SSC strategy.
The bidders only submit one bid in the market with their higher valuation; and
without competition in that market they take no further action later on. Note that
due to the bidding agent any bid until the valuation can be used as a signal. In all
other cases, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in SSC strategies evolves.h Therefore,
a special distribution of values is necessary to facilitate collusive results. Either
vx1 > vx2 and vy2 > vy1 or vx1 < vx2 and vy2 < vy1 leads to a collusive result under
the given circumstances. Due to symmetry, we assume vx1 > vx2 and vy2 > vy1 in
the following.
In the proof of Proposition 1, BL conclude that given the conditions in 3 “the
bidders will collude when the opportunity arises”. This includes giving a correct
signal in the ﬁrst stage, i.e. bidders are willing to truthfully signal their type (the
market with the higher valuation). Hence, for bidder x the surplus using the CSC
strategy equals πx(CSC) = vx1. Defecting from the CSC strategy leads to the
expected surplus (the results for bidder y are analoguous):
E[πx(SSC) ] =
∫ vx1
0
(vx1 − vy1)2f(vy1)(1− F (vy1))dvy1
+
∫ vx2
0
(vx2 − vy2)2f(vy2)F (vy2)dvy2, (1)
gEngelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn [2005] discuss sets of consistent beliefs of the bidders.
hBL also discuss collusion strategies with more information. For us it is suﬃcient to discuss the
easiest form of collusion.
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which is lower than πx(CSC). The ﬁrst part of the equation equals the expected
payoﬀ in market 1 given vy1 is the lower value of bidder y and the second part
equals the expected payoﬀ in market 2 given vy2 is the higher value of bidder y.
The sellers’ payoﬀ is zero in the CSC case and positive in the SSC case. Fur-
thermore, collusive behavior can decrease eﬃciency in the CSC case. Assume for
example vx1 > vx2, vy1 < vy2, and vx2 > vy2: CSC strategies leave object 2 to
bidder y although bidder x has a higher valuation for this object. SSC strategies
always lead to eﬃcient outcomes.
In the simultaneous soft close auction with two markets and two bidders collusive
behavior is possible and forms a symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium in CSC
strategies which dominates the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in SSC strategies in
terms of bidders’ surplus. However, the seller is worse oﬀ and eﬃciency is reduced.
3.2. The simultaneous hard close auction
As in part 3.1 we only consider a situation where collusion is possible (vx1 > vx2
and vy2 > vy1). Further, we assume that bidders truthfully signal their preferred
market in the ﬁrst stage as discussed in the appendix of BL (p. 429).
We show that collusive behavior, especially a modiﬁcation of the CSC strategy,
cannot be an equilibrium strategy.i Therefore, we consider two signaling strategies,
where bidders signal their preferred market in the ﬁrst stage. At ﬁrst, assume a
good will “signaling” (CHC) strategy in the simultaneous hard close auction (0 ≤
bij ≤ vij):
• If vi1 > vi2 submit b1i1 = bi1 and b1i2 = ω;
• If vi1 < vi2 submit b1i1 = ω and b1i2 = bi2;
• If, in stage 2,
b1x1 = ω and b
1
y1 ≥ 0 and b1x2 ≥ 0 and b1y2 = ω
or
b1x1 ≥ 0 and b1y1 = ω and b1x2 = ω and b1y2 ≥ 0
the bidders divide the markets among each other and submit b2i1 = vi1 if vi1 > vi2
and b2i2 = vi2 if vi1 < vi2;
• If, in stage 2, b1xj = b1yj or if someone defects from the bidding instructions given
above, then all types revert to the SSC strategy.
This CHC strategy equals the CSC strategy in that the bidders signal their favorite
market and bidders can divide the markets according to their highest valuations.
However, it is implemented such that bidders in the second stage submit their
valuation in their preferred market. This makes defection of the other bidder more
expensive and is therefore superior to submitting a ﬁnal bid b0 as in the collusion
strategy of BL.
iWe do not consider side payments or repeated interaction.
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Contrary to the CHC strategy assume a sniping (SHC) strategy in the simulta-
neous hard close auction (0 ≤ bij ≤ vij):
• If vi1 > vi2 submit b1i1 = bi1 and b1i2 = ω;
• If vi1 < vi2 submit b1i1 = ω and b1i2 = bi2;
• Play the SSC strategy in stage 2
In this strategy the bidders signal a willingness to collude in the ﬁrst stage and
indicate their full willingness to pay in each market in the second stage.
Considering these two strategies, this situation is a prisoner’s dilemma with C =
Cooperation, i.e. playing the CHC strategy, and D = Defection, i.e. playing the SHC
strategy. Mutual cooperation and mutual defection leads to the same results as in
Part 3.1. Playing D while the other bidder plays C potentially yields additional
gains from the less preferred market, whereas playing C while the other bidders
plays D potentially yields zero gains from their own preferred market. The payoﬀs
for bidder x depend on strategy combinations (Sx; Sy) where Si is either C or D
and are (recall the assumption of the bidders’ valuations):
E[πx(CD)] =
∫ vx1
0
(vx1 − vy1)2f(vy1)(1− F (vy1))dvy1, (Ix)
E[πx(DD)] = E[πx(SSC)], (IIx)
E[πx(CC)] = vx1, (IIIx)
and E[πx(DC)] = vx1 +
∫ vx2
0
(vx2 − vy2)2f(vy2)F (vy2)dvy2. (IVx)
The payoﬀs for bidder y depending on strategy are
E[πy(CD)] =
∫ vy2
0
(vy2 − vx2)2f(vx2)(1 − F (vx2))dvx2, (Iy)
E[πy(DD)] = E[πy(SSC )], (IIy)
E[πy(CC)] = vy2, (IIIy)
and E[πy(DC)] = vy2 +
∫ vy1
0
(vy1 − vx1)2f(vx1)F (vx1)dvx1. (IVy)
Using a normal form matrix reveals a prisoner’s dilemma situation with expected
proﬁts as Table 1 shows.
Defection is a dominant strategy since IVi > IIIi and IIi > Ii. Hence, the SHC
strategy is the best response to both given strategies. This proﬁle forms a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (with a consistent belief system), i.e. if the probability that
the competitor plays the CHC strategy (p) is positive, the best response is to play
SHC for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. In equilibrium the expected payoﬀ in the simultaneous hard
close auction equals the expected payoﬀ in the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in SSC
In
t. 
G
am
e 
Th
eo
ry
 R
ev
. 2
01
1.
13
:7
5-
82
. D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.c
om
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
LU
X
EM
BO
U
RG
 o
n 
03
/1
4/
14
. F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
November 18, 2011 11:14 WSPC/0219-1989 151-IGTR 00285
Collusion or Sniping in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions 81
Table 1. Prisoner’s Dilemma payoﬀ matrix.
Bidder y
CHC SHC
Bidder x
CHC IIIx IIIy Ix IVy
SHC IVx Iy IIx IIy
with IVi > IIIi > IIi > Ii.
strategies in the simultaneous soft close auction.j The seller receives the highest
payoﬀ and full eﬃciency is guaranteed.
Obviously, this game has further equilibria. All strategies that lead to bidding
the valuation in both markets at least in the second stage forms an equilibrium.
One equilibrum with asymmetric strategies is bidding for the object if the valuation
is the highest in the market and not bidding otherwise.
4. Conclusion
In simultaneous English auctions (soft close auctions) with multiple objects, a col-
lusive equilibrium where bidders reduce their payments exists (Brusco and Lopomo
[2002]). This equilibrium holds due to the fact that defection from a collusive
agreement can be punished later on because the English auction ends if no bid-
der wants to submit a bid. This collusive equilibrium in simultaneous hard close
auctions, however, cannot be sustained even with only two bidders. In this auc-
tion format, the best response to a collusive strategy is to play a sniping strat-
egy, i.e. signal to collude early in the auction but defect from collusion at the
very last moment; giving the competitor no chance to react due to the deadline.
Hence, in equilibrium the sniping strategy prevails. The situation equals a Pris-
oner’s Dilemma situation because both bidders may increase their payoﬀs with
mutual cooperation.
This result is due to the fact that the hard close auction has a ﬁxed bidding
deadline. As the number of bidders and the number of objects increase, coordination
possibilities decrease and this advantage of the simultaneous hard close auction
diminishes.
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